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Co-Investigators 
Professor Tom Ormerod and Dr. Linden Ball from the Lancaster-Warwick-Sterling node 
collaborated with Dr. Nicholas Bardsley from the Hub. The Lancaster university team 
provided input to the theory backing the designs, drawing on economic-psychology 
models of decision making, in particular ‘Third Generation Prospect Theory’ which is 
tested in Experiment 1. In addition Professor Charlie Lewis at the Lancaster-Warwick-
Sterling node provided advice on the data analysis for the experiments. Dr. Bardsley 
conducted most of the experimental design whilst the experiments were 
operationalised and carried out at Lancaster with the help of a Research Assistant. Dr. 
Bardsley provided the methodological focus for the project drawing on work in his 
forthcoming volume on this topic. 
 
Summary of Activities 
Two novel experiments were conducted within this project, covering Preference 
Reversals, Allais Paradox tasks and Dictator Games. In each case the aim was to see 
whether classic results from designs run in classical experimental economics mode 
generalise to more realistic (but still incentivised) tasks with more psychological content. 
In classical mode, experiments are run in a socially-sterile environment with 
transparent and full information about payoffs and probabilities. The Preference 
Reversals design introduced tasks without clear information about either the 
probabilities or consequences in the gambles. It also introduced a test of a new 
interdisciplinary model of decision-making known as Third Generation Prospect Theory, 
which incorporates insights from psychology into a rationalistic economic model. The 
data analysis for Experiment 1 also goes beyond what is normal in this literature. We 
apply McNemar’s test of marginal homogeneity to the experimental data to distinguish 
(as the literature generally does not) between purely stochastic preference reversals 
and systematic asymmetry between choice and valuation data. The Allais Paradox 
tasks introduced simulated outcomes of a lottery to convey the probability and payoff 
information, and the Dictator Game tasks introduced social information about others’ 
behaviour. This is to test whether Dictator Game giving is really unconditional or if 
social learning makes a difference, as evolutionary game theorists have claimed. 
Experimental sessions took place at Lancaster University’s Department of Psychology. 
 
The experimental procedures are summarised below: 
Pilot: 26 subjects. The pilot was used to try to optimise parameters for the experiments 
proper. 
 
Experiment 1: Preference Reversals with vague gambles. 
104 subjects in two treatments.  
 
Experiment 2: Allais Paradox (AP) tasks and Dictator Games (DG) tasks. 
200 subjects in two treatments per task set (AP and DG tasks).  
 
 
Outputs  
A working paper has been prepared for Experiment 1 which will be made available on 
the NCRM website, entitled “Preference Reversals: Alive and Well Despite Radically 
Uncertain Prospects”. The experiment finds some evidence that transparency 
enhances the incidence of preference reversals, though vague lotteries do still produce 
the preference reversal phenomenon. So preference reversal is not an artefact of 
unrealistically transparent decision problems, though it may be accentuated by them. 
The paper also tested ‘third generation prospect theory’ but did not find (contrary to the 
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theory) that holding the reference point constant between choice and valuation tasks 
reduced the incidence of preference reversal. The evidence collected therefore 
contributes to the ongoing controversy over whether a more psychologically 
sophisticated decision theory or brute psychological processes explain the 
phenomenon, on the side of the latter. A second working paper will be prepared for 
Experiment 2 as soon as the data have been entered and analysed and made 
available on the NCRM website. 
 
 
